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THE USES OF MYTH: A RESPONSE
TO PROFESSOR BASSETT
Susan H. Williams*
In his essay, Professor Bassett traces the roots of the "myth of
the nomad," a myth which was used to justify the dispossession and
destruction of Native Americans by colonial settlers. Bassett's pri-
mary focus is on a careful exposition of the sources and uses of the
myth. The historical evidence he presents is persuasive and interest-
ing, and his analysis is often thought-provoking.
I find myself, however, in some disagreement with Bassett over
the function this type of work serves. While Bassett recognizes that
"[w]e are all creators of myths,"1 he insists that we should "bring to
light" the myths in the law and expose their "insidious uses[s]." 2 As
Bassett observes, the first-year property course offers numerous op-
portunities for the unmasking of such myths. Bassett seems to sug-
gest that we view his fascinating essay as one such attempt to
"demythologize the law."'3
It is not possible, nor would it be desirable, to "demythologize"
the law. The law is constructed upon, and often even constituted by,
myths.4 The effort to eliminate those myths would produce legal con-
cepts that were far less human, and probably no more humane. Our
task, as both teachers and scholars, should be to recognize and evalu-
ate the myths we use, but not necessarily to abandon them. Bassett's
essay offers a fine beginning for this project of understanding.
A myth is simply a kind of shorthand-a condensed codification
of accumulated cultural understandings cast in an imaginative, and
therefore memorable, form.5 The importance of myth, and its value,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
1. Basset, The Myth of the Nomad in Property Law, 4 J. LAW & RELIG. 133 at 151
(1987).
2. Id. at 152.
3. Id. at 151.
4. Cf Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 45 (1983) ("No set
of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it
meaning."); J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LoSE THEIR MEANING 11 (1984) ("Social and polit-
ical institutions are ... complex sets of understandings, relations, and activities. They are
ways of talking that can be learned and understood, and they play their part in constitution a
world.").
5. This definition of myth, while far from uncontroversial among cultural anthropolo-
gists, does, I think, represent a starting point with which many would agree. See, e.g., C.
LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 202-28 (1967); Stanner, The Dreaming,
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lies not in its superficial truth or falsity, but in the cultural under-
standings that it represents and the effectiveness with which it repre-
sents them. The simple fact, that something is a myth-that it does
not reflect an historically accurate or objectively verifiable reality-is
not a sufficient reason to reject it. Nor is a demonstration of the
myth's historical or cultural contingency an adequate refutation of its
cultural content. Myth, with all its incongruity and contingency, is
the stuff of which culture is made, and culture is the raw material of
the law.
Although we cannot, in general, judge a myth by its historical
inaccuracy or contingency, we can assess the continuing vitality of a
myth by attempting to unde:rstand it on its own terms. I see at least
three stages in this empathetic critique. First, we must attempt to
precisely describe the myth itself. Given the variability of cultural
phenomena such as myths over both time and place, description is no
easy task. But if we are to understand a myth, we must first clearly
describe it. Second, we must discern and define the cultural insights
represented by the myth. This second step requires that we empathet-
ically enter into the experience of those who believed the myth, so
that we can understand the cultural vision that the myth reified for
them. And, third, we must somehow judge the character of the myth.
Measured by its coherence with our own intuitions-moral, meta-
physical, or otherwise-the cultural vision implicit in the myth may
be good or bad, accurate or inaccurate. In this short response to Bas-
sett's essay, I can only point out a few of the issues that might arise in
such an analysis of the myth of the nomad.
Bassett's essay initiates the first step in this empathetic critique
by searching out the sources, of the myth in the Elizabethan experi-
ence in Ireland and in social theory contemporaneous with the set-
tling and expansion of the American colonies. He uses these
historical materials persuasively to define the outlines of the myth and
to evoke the experience of those who believed in it. And Bassett,
quite clearly, draws an emphatic normative conclusion from these
READER IN COMPARATIVE RELIGION, AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 269-77 (W. Lessa
& E. Vogt eds. 1965); cf C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 1-13 (1973) ("cul-
ture consists of socially established structures of meaning"). Even those who accept this basic
definition would, of course, disagree about the method of analysis that should be applied to
decipher the cultural meaning of myths. The purposes and materials of legal analysis differ
from the purposes and materials of cultural anthropology; thus, the question of method must
be addressed independently by legal scholars. The particular method that I have suggested is
simply a first approximation of an approach that obviously will require a much more sophisti-
cated exposition.
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materials: the myth was destructive, in that it was used unjustifiably
to harm Native Americans and others, and it continues to be danger-
ous and destructive today.6
This is, for most of us, an unexceptional conclusion. But it is
reached without the benefit of the intervening analysis I have sug-
gested. Therefore, we are left without any explicit explanation of why
the myth is destructive, why it should be abandoned.7 One possible
answer is suggested by Bassett's frequent references to the fact that
the myth of the nomad represented a distortion of the lifestyles and
cultures of many of the Native Americans with whom the colonists
came into contact.' This historical inaccuracy cannot, however, be the
source of Bassett's doubts about the validity of the myth itself. The
claims about the moral and social status of nomads which form the
heart of the myth are independent of the appropriateness of any par-
ticular application of the myth. We might simply ask whether Bassett
(or those of us who are inclined to agree with his conclusion) would
find the myth equally unacceptable if it were applied to one of the
American Indian tribes that more closely resembled the nomadic
mode. 9 If his objections would remain unchanged, as I think it clear
they would, then historical inaccuracy is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient element in his negative assessment of the myth.10
So how should we go about explaining, examining, or justifying
our common conclusion that the myth is destructive and should be
abandoned? It is not sufficient simply to point out that the myth is
historically inaccurate, that it served the purposes of the dominant
cultural group, or that it was used to justify cruelty and violence.
These facts may be relevant, of course, but they are not determinative:
6. See Bassett, supra note 1, at 135, 150.
7. I assume that the fact that the myth caused great human suffering is not a sufficient
reason to abandon it. There is, of course, the obvious point that the same idea may be capable
of causing both great evil and great good. Assuming, however, that some ideas carry inevitable
harmful consequences, such ideas may, nonetheless, be valuable and worth preserving. The
tremendous cost we pay for some of our myths clearly requires that we provide a stronger
justification for those myths, but it does not make them necessarily illegitimate. Democracy
may also be a myth, and one for which many people have died and killed, but that does not
prove that we should abandon it.
8. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 1, at 133, 144, 149.
9. For example, some northern New England Indians were, in fact, primarily nomadic
hunter-gatherers. See W. CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND 37-39 (1983).
10. As Bassett points out, the descriptive distortion imposed by the myth is nonetheless
significant because it indicates how strong the need to believe must have been. In order to
overcome the often contradictory experiences of everyday life, the myth of the nomad would
have required a particularly strong ideological or material foundation. See Bassett, supra note
1, at 135.
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a myth may be suspect for all of these reasons and nonetheless contain
cultural insights that we find both valuable and true. Again, the es-
sential questions are: what exactly does the myth say, what is the
cultural information it carries, and do we find that cultural vision, or
any part of it, true and valuable?
Bassett begins the process of precisely describing the myth, but in
at least one respect his description is unclear. He asserts throughout
the essay that the myth of the nomad was used to rob people not only
of their property, but also of their human rights. I I His claim seems to
be that the myth points to a single set of characteristics, the posses-
sion of which disqualifies an individual for both property ownership
and personhood.' 2 If this is true, then the myth of the nomad could
tell us a great deal about the underlying cultural assumptions con-
cerning the relationship between property rights and personhood 1 3
It is, however, unclear to me from the historical evidence Bassett
adduces, whether the congruence between property rights and per-
sonhood in the myth is so complete. The myth appears to contain
two logically and empirically distinct sets of characteristics-a no-
madic lifestyle and a non-Christian religion---each of which may have
carried particular implications for the subject's legal status. In other
words, the pagan nomad may have lacked property rights primarily
because he was nomadic-and therefore uncivilized-while he lacked
full human rights primarily because he was non-Christian. Per-
sonhood and property rights would then rest on very different founda-
tions, and stand in a less direct relation to each other.
Bassett recognizes that these two elements of the myth-civiliza-
tion and Christianity-are distinct, and acknowledges that the
Elizabethans also recognized the distinction. 4 Although Bassett ar-
gues that the two concepts were, nonetheless, closely linked for six-
teenth century Englishmen, the ambiguous evidence he produces
concerning the extent and nature of this connection does not lead to a
clear conclusion. 5 In order to understand the cultural categories at
11. See Bassett, supra note 1, at 135, 150.
12. See id. at 134, 150.
13. For a discussion of this relation, see generally Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
STAN L. REV. 957 (1982).
14. See Bassett, supra note 1, at 139.
15. Bassett argues that the colonizers found it impossible to assert that a people was un-
civilized if they had recognized that the people were Christian. This explains for Bassett the
English refusal to recognize Irish Catholicism as Christianity and the persistent English char-
acterization of the Irish as pagans. It is, of course, possible that the English classified Christi-
anity with alleged Irish lack of civilization. It is also possible, however, that the English
imposed that pagan classification simply in order to be free of the moral scruples that might
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work in the myth, we need to know more clearly and exactly whether
and in what ways the concept of civilization and Christianity were
interrelated. 16
Having satisfactorily disentangled the pieces of the myth, two
difficult tasks remain. First, we must try to understand the cultural
vision implicit in the myth. What does it tell us about the nature,
source, and justification of a property right that such a right cannot be
acquired by someone engaged in a nomadic lifestyle? What is the na-
ture and significance of personhood if it is dependent upon a religious
affiliation or a certain degree of virtue? Bassett has provided us with
several clues in the search for answers to these questions.
Various theories of property emerge with striking clarity in the
quotations Bassett reproduces from some of the sources of the myth.
The labor theory of property,17 the social contract theory, Is and the
utilitarian or economic theory 9 all appear as justifications and expla-
nations of the refusal to recognize the property rights of nomadic peo-
ples. All of these models of property are incorporated, however, into
a larger theory which defines the structure of social evolution. Ac-
cording to this theory, nomadic peoples lack property rights as
against competing agricultural or commercial peoples because no-
madic societies occupy a lower level of development on the evolution-
ary path leading from primitive or "barbaric" societies to civilized
ones.2" To respect the rights of the nomadic people would be to halt
otherwise restrict them in their dealings with the Irish. The evidence Bassett describes does
not resolve this ambiguity. See id. at 138.
Moreover, even if Bassett is right that the English could not reconcile Christian faith with
an uncivilized society, the two concepts-Christianity and civilization-may nonetheless be
distinct. The inference may run only in one direction: Christianity may imply civilization, but
civilization need not imply Christianity. In that case, the myth might still assign very different
roles to nomadism and paganism as the determinants of property rights or personhood.
16. Perhaps the relation between civilization and Christianity might be more clearly illu-
minated by an exploration of English impressions of groups that cut dramatically across these
distinctions. For example, Bassett mentions that the English were aware of the Chinese, who
were a non-Christian nation, but a highly civilized one in European terms. See Bassett, supra
note 1, at 146 (discussing a French work which was translated into English in 1761). Contem-
poraneous English impressions of China may shed some light on the possibility of including
"civilized pagans" in the Elizabethan or colonial cultural categories. If such a category ex-
isted, then the "pagan nomad" would be revealed as a combination of two severable sets of
characteristics that might have very different implications for the assignment of property rights
and the recognition of personhood.
17. See Bassett, supra note 1, at 144 (quoting E. DE VATTELL, LES DROIT DES GENS 31-
38 (C. Fenwick trans. 1916)).
18. See id. at 145 (quoting H. GROTIUS, II DE JURE BELLI AC PACiS 2.21-5 (1625)).
19. See id. at 145 (quoting, inter alia, D. HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 31 (L.A.
Selby-Bigge ed. 1888)).
20. See id. at 143 (describing several sources). For more modem discussion of such evolu-
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the progress of this evolution to a higher form of society. The various
theories of property serve to define this higher form of social organi-
zation-as, for example, one based upon a social contract2 1-and also
to justify its superior position-because, for example, it protects the
use of labor to create value. 2 2 This evolutionary theory places prop-
erty rights in a matrix of social conditions and relations, many of
which have implications for the nature and limits of the concept of
property.
Similarly, Bassett ties the notion of personhood, in the historical
sources, to some minimal degree of virtue, or virtuous behavior.23
And virtue, in turn, is considered practically unattainable without a
Christian fear of God and, perhaps also, without the restraint im-
posed by a community of fellow Christians.24 Personhood, then, ap-
pears to be dependent upon certain connections to God and to other
persons. Without those connections, a human being is morally indis-
tinguishable from any other animal. A closer examination of the na-
ture of these relationships should yield a clearer understanding of the
concept of personhood which is implicit in the myth of the pagan
nomad.
The final task, once the myth is clearly defined and its cultural
conceptions decoded, is to assess that cultural vision in terms of our
own normative understandings. 25 We can, at this point in the analy-
sis, express an opinion about the myth's truth or value or lack thereof.
That opinion will be the result of an informed and self-conscious eval-
uation of the cultural message of the myth, and not merely an unex-
amined reaction to the historical uses of the myth.
tionary theories, see generally Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, THE ECONOMICS
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (E. Furobotn & S. Pejovich eds. 1974); P. STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION
(1980).
21. See Bassett, supra note 1, at 145 (quoting Grotius).
22. See id. at 144 (quoting de Vattell).
23. See id. at 142 (quoting an anonymous pamphleteer).
24. See id..
25. I have deliberately left ambiguous the method of normative assessment to be applied
in this analysis. The choice of a normative theory is, of course, a very large and independent
subject. I assume that each scholar will use whatever ethical theory he or she usually uses to
assess the law.
When the myth is in some sense a part of "our own" culture, one useful approach may be
to search for what John Rawls called "reflective equilibrium." We begin with, on the one
hand, a set of moral intuitions and considered judgments and, on the other hand, a mechanism
for generating principles. In Rawls' case the mechanism is the original position; in our analy-
sis it is the cultural understandings implicit in the myth. We then compare the principles, and
their consequences, with our moral intuitions, modifying and replacing elements of both sets in
response to each other, until we arrive at a "reflective equilibrium." See J. RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1971).
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Such an evaluation may lead us to the same conclusion with
which we began, but it may also offer us additional insights in the
process. We may gain a deeper understanding of why and how the
myth worked so powerfully and for so long. We may also discover
the extent to which we still share some of the underlying cultural as-
sumptions which the myth reflects-for example, the evolutionary
theory of civilization-and we may recognize the connection between
such assumptions and some of our otherwise unquestioned legal and
moral precepts. Finally, we may learn more about ourselves through
the attempt to specify the reasons why we believe the cultural assump-
tions of the myth must be abandoned.
Myth is a tremendous tool for legal scholars. It is a key to the
cultural imagination out of which legal concepts take shape. We must
use that tool to its fullest, beginning with an historical explanation of
the sources and uses of the myth, but also going on to explore the
cultural information the myth represents and the insight it may offer
into our own imaginations. Professor Bassett has offered us a begin-
ning; I hope his invitation will be enthusiastically accepted.
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